Cornelius Castoriadis: Notes on the Social Imaginary

A collection of notes written by the post-Marxist Cornelius Castoriadis on the topic of the imagination, and his concept of the social imaginary.

Notes to accompany the podcast with Joe Ruffell about Castoriadis:

Blake, Castoriadis and the Social Imaginary

History is essentially poiesis, not imitative poetry, but creation and ontological genesis in and through individuals doing and representing / saying.¹

The social imaginary

But what one would seek in vain [in the history of thought] is what I call the instituting social imaginary, which is to say the acknowledgement of the basic fact that one cannot 'explain' either the birth of society or the course of history by natural factors, be they biological or other, anymore than by the ‘rational’ activity of a 'rational' being (man). From the start of history, one sees the emergence of radical novelty, and if we do not wish to resort to transcendental factors to account for this, we definitely must postulate a power of creation, a vis formandi, imminent to human collectivity as well as to individual human beings. Consequently, it is quite natural that we call this faculty of radical innovation, this ability to create art of form, the imaginary and imagination. Language, customs, norms and technique cannot ‘be explained’ by factors extrinsic to human connectivity. No natural, biological, or logical factor can account for them.…
We must therefore recognise that there is, in human collectivities, a power of creation, a vis formandi, which I call the instituting social imaginary.²

What horrifies and irritates representatives of traditional philosophy, as well as members of the scientific establishment, is the necessity of acknowledging the existence of a collective imaginary, and for that matter, of a radical imagination in singular human beings, as a creative force. Creation here means creation ex nihilo, bringing into being a form that was not there before, the creation of new forms of being. It is ontological creation: a form such as language, institution qua institution, music, and painting; or some specific form, some work of art, musical, pictorial, poetic or other. Why is philosophy, in the forms we have inherited, unable to acknowledge the fact of creation? Because that philosophy is either theological, and therefore reserves creation for God… or it is rationalist or determinist, and therefore obliged either to infer everything that is from first principles (and from what, then, do we infer the first principles?) or else to produce it out of causes (and from what does one produce the first causes?). But creation belongs to being in general… and creation belongs, densely and massively, to socio-historical being.³

“creation belongs to being in general”⁴

God, for instance, the God of the monotheistic religions, is a social imaginary signification, upheld by a myriad of institutions such as the church. The same is true of the gods of polytheistic religions and a founding heroes, of totems, taboos, fetishes, and so forth. When we talk about the state, we are talking about an institution animated by imaginary significations.⁵

The radical imagination of human beings has to be tamed, then, channeled, regulated, and brought into line with life in society, and also with what we call ‘reality.’ This is achieved by socialisation, through which individuals absorb the institution of society and its significations, internalise them, learn language, the categorisation of things and what is right and wrong, what is acceptable behaviour and what is not, what must be adulated and what hated. When that socialisation occurs, the radical imagination is stifled, to a point, in its most important manifestations: it expresses itself more conventionally and repetitiously. Under these conditions society at large is heteronomous. But so are individuals heteronomous, for the only apparently use their own judgement, whereas in fact they apply social criteria when judging.⁶

Heteronomous, esemplastically-enabled societies

Societies in which the possibility and the ability to call established institutions and significations into question are exceptional, a minute number in the history of humanity. We actually only have two examples. The first is ancient Greece, with the birth of democracy and philosophy; the second is Western Europe, after the Middle Ages, that long period of heteronomy.⁷

Failure of historical explanation

What is important here, from the standpoint of the elucidation of history, is the failure of ‘explanations.’ There is nothing surprising about that. No more than we can ‘explain’ the creative phases of history, why they occur at a particular time or the content of that creation, we are symmetrically unable to ‘explain’ the occurrence of phases of decadence, the period in which state take place, all the stuff of which they are made. We may collect all sorts of partial facts that seem to make these alternating phases more comprehensible, but never does this yield a true ‘explanation.’ There are no ‘laws’ commanding the radical imagination, when it flourishes on when it fades away…⁸

Art, science, death

There is a profound kinship between art on the one hand, and philosophy and science on the other. Not only does one see the creative imagination at work in all of them, but also, art and philosophy and science are attempts to give form to chaos – to the chaos underlaying the cosmos, the world, the chaos that is below those successive layers of appearances. In the depths of being there is that indetermination, the corollary of its power of creation, the successive determinations of which are embodied by the infinite leaves of the cosmos.
The institution of society also aims at covering over that chaos, at creating a world for society, and it does so, but there is no way of avoiding the existence of tremendous holes in that creation, great conduits through which chaos is clearly evidenced. One of those ducts, for human beings, and no doubt the most difficult to block off, is death, which every known institution of society has attempted to make meaningful.⁹

Death of creation, the interregnum

A long section in pp83-85 on “the exhaustion of creativity in the artistic field"¹⁰

This reversion to conformism is an overall relapse into heteronomy. I have to find heteronomy as thinking and acting in ways imposed (overtly or subterraneously) by the institution or the social environment. Now presently, just as there is a pensée unique, a one-track, conformist way of thinking about economics, where no one dares to challenge the neoliberal inanities that are driving European economies to the ruin, no one seems to be capable of challenging the "end of philosophy," or of saying that what goes on as painting is worthless for the most part; not just mediocre or barely decent, but worthless. Anyone who does will be told he is a bore and a know-nothing where art is concerned, or an old man who refuses to admit the times have changed.
This overall picture, supposing one accept it and even roughly agrees with my interpretation of it, expresses a crisis in the overall societal institution and in social imaginary significations. As I have already pointed out, this crisis isn’t incompatible with continued "progress" in technology and production, scholarship, and even science. I for one… have doubts as to the possibility for even that sort of ‘progress’ to continue for very long, once deprived of the roots that formerly nourished it.
I think we are at a crossroads in history, in History with a capital H. One path is now clearly marked, at least as for its general direction. That path leads to the loss of meaning, the repetition of empty forms, conformism, apathy, irresponsibility, and cynicism, along with the growing takeover of the capitalist imaginary of unlimited expansion of ‘rational mastery’ – pseudo-rational pseudo-mastery – of the unlimited expansion of consumption for consumption sake, which is to say for nothing, and of technoscience racing ahead on its own, and obviously a party to domination by that capitalist imaginary.
The other path would have to be opened up; it has not been marked out at all. Only a social and political awakening, a renaissance, a fresh upsurge of the project of individual and collective autonomy – that is, of the will to be free – can cut that path. This would require an awakening of imagination and of the creative imaginary. For reasons I have tried to formulate here, any such arousal is impossible to predict, by definition. It is synonymous with social and political revival. The two go [p87] hand-in-hand. All we can do is prepare it in whatever way we can, from our own particular place.¹¹

Imagination: Animal vs. Human

Let us consider the imagination of singular human beings. It is the essential determining element (the essence) of the human psyche. This psyche is radical imagination, first of all in as much as it is an unceasing flux or stream of representations, desires, and affects. That stream is continuous emergence. Never mind if you close your eyes and pluck up your ears; there will always be something. That thing goes on 'inside.' Images, memories, hopes, fears, 'psychic states' surge fourth, in ways we may sometimes understand or even 'explain,' at other times absolutely not. There is no 'logical' thought process here, with few exceptions, and discontinuously. The elements are not tied together in a rational or even a reasonable way; there is a surging, an inextricable mixture. Above all, there are representations that have no functionality. Animals, higher animals at any rate, conceivably have a degree of representation of the world, but that representation – and its components – is regulated functionally; it contains primarily what is necessary for the life of the animal and the continuation of its species. But in human beings, imagination is defunctionalized. Human beings can give up their lives to win glory. What is the 'functionality' of glory? At most, it will be a name engraved on a monument, itself eminently perishable. Glory is the subjective corollary of a value of the social imaginary that constitutes one pole in human activities, or at least in the activities of some, bringing into existence a desire directed toward it.¹²

No society is devoid of culture, of course. No society is reduced to functionality or instrumentality; no known human society lives like the 'societies' of bees or ants. There are always songs and dances, decorations, things that are 'useless'… As you know, what are probably among the oldest, if not the oldest, known prehistoric paintings have been discovered in Portugal, on the walls of Palaeolithic caves. Those people spent their time in poorly lit caves to do cave-wall paintings. They thought that was more important than to develop the productive forces or to maximise the yield of the capital.¹³

heteronomous va autonomous societies

Castoriadis: Imagination: History of the idea

nb. Aristotle’s discovery of the imagination in his treatise De Anima [On the Soul]” [p213]

AW-was imagination required before The Severing?

… it is illuminating to think the history of the mainstream of philosophy as the elaboration of reason, homologous to the positing of being as being-determined, or determinacy… For what does not pertain to reason and determined being has always been assigned, in the central channel, to the infrathinkable or to the suprathinkable, to indetermination as mere privation, deficit of determination, that is to say, of being, or to an absolutely transcendent and inaccessible origin of all determination.
This position has, at all times, entailed the covering back over of alterity and of its source, the positive rupture of already given determination, of creation not simply as undetermined but as determining or as the positing of new determinations. In other words, it has at all times entailed the occultation of the radical imaginary and, correlatively, that of time as time of creation and not of repetition.
This occultation is total and patent as concerns the socio-historical dimension of the radical imaginary, that is, the social imaginary or instituting society. In this case, the motivations, if one my express oneself Voss, are clear. It up and change intrinsically and constitutively to the known institution of society, as heteronomous institution, to exclude the idea that it might be self-institution, the work of society as instituting. At most (in modern times), the self-institution of society will be seen as the implementation [mise en oeuvre] or application to human affairs of reason and it's finally understood form.
Philosophy could not avoid, however, an encounter with the other dimension of the radical imaginary, its psychical dimension, the radical imagination of the subject. Here, the occultation could not be radical. It has been the occultation of the radical character of the imagination, the reduction of the latter to a secondary role, sometimes a perturbing and negative one, sometimes auxiliary and instru­mental: the question has always been posed in terms of the role the imagination plays in our relation to a True / False, Beauty / Ugliness, Good / Bad posited as already given and determined elsewhere. What mattered, indeed, was to assure the theory - the view or the constitution - of what is, of what must be done, of what is valid, in its necessity, in its very determinacy. The imagination is, however, in its essence rebellious against determinacy. To this extent, it most of the time will simply be scotomized, or relegated to ‘psychology,’ or ‘interpreted’ and ‘explained’ in terms of its products, using flagrantly superficial ideas such as ‘compensation’ for some unsatisfied need or desire. (The imagination is ob­viously not effect of, but condition for desire, as Aristotle already knew: "There is no desiring without imagination," De Anima 433b29.) And even where the creative role of the imagination will be recognized, when Kant sees in the work of art ‘produced’ by genius the undetermined and indeterminable positing of new determinations, there will still be an ‘instrumentality’ of a higher order, a subordination of the imagination to something else that allows one to gauge its works. In the Critique of judgment, the ontological status of the work of art is a reflection or a derivative of its value status, which consists in the presentation within intuition of the Ideas for which Reason cannot, in principle, furnish a discursive representation.
Nevertheless, this cover-up will be interrupted twice in the history of philoso­phy. Each time the rupture will be difficult to achieve, antinomical in character, and creative of insoluble aporias. What is thereby discovered, the imagination, does not allow itself to be held and contained, nor put into place or in its place in a clear, univocal, and assignable relation to sensibility and thought. And each time the rupture will be followed immediately by a strange and total forgetting.
It is Aristotle who first discovers the imagination – and he discovers it twice, that is, he discovers two imaginations. He discovers first (De Anima 3-3) the imagination in the sense that later became banal, which I shall henceforth call the second imagination, and he lays down the doctrine of the imagination that has since his time become conventional and that still reigns today in fact and in substance. He then discovers another imagination, one with a much more radical function, that enjoys almost nothing but a homonymic relation to the previous one, and which I shall henceforth call the first imagination. This discovery takes place in the middle of book 3 of De Anima; it is neither made explicit nor thema­tized as such, it interrupts the logical order of the treatise and, of infinitely greater importance, it virtually bursts apart Aristotelian ontology – which amounts to saying, ontology tout court. And it will be ignored in interpretations and com­mentaries, as well as in the history of philosophy, which will use the discovery of the second imagination to cover up the discovery of the first imagination.
One will have to wait until Kant (and, following him, Fichte) for the question of the imagination again to be posed, renewed, and opened in a much more explicit and much broader fashion-though just as antinomical, untenable, and uncontainable. And again in this case, a new cover-up will rapidly supervene. In his youthful writings, Hegel pursued and, at times, radicalized the movement initiated by Kant and Fichte: the imagination, he writes in Faith and Knowledge, is not a ‘middle term’ but ‘that which is first and original.’ These writings, however, will remain unpublished and unknown. Things will go in an entirely other direction in his published work. No trace of the theme or the term ‘imagination’ will be found in the Phenomenology of Spirit. And later on, Hegel will switch the emphasis from imagination to memory, to which he will transfer the ‘objectifiable‘ works of the imagination (reproaching the Ancients for having lowered memory to the rank of the imagination: Encyclopaedia §462 Zusatz); and what he will again call, in the Propaedeutic and the Encyclopaedia, ‘active imagination' and ‘creative imagination’ will in fact be only a selective recom­bination of empirical data guided by the Idea – an astounding banality, after the Kantian Critiques. Thus, with regard to this question, Hegel restores and re­establishes the vulgar tradition, still dominant today, which merely reproduces the first exposition of the imagination in Aristotle's treatise: relegating the imagination to the realm of ‘psychology,’ fixing its place between sensation and intellection (which completely obliterates the admirable ninth chapter of book 3 of De Anima and its refutation in advance of the Encyclopaedia's apothecary storage system), making it merely reproductive in character and recombinatory suspect status.
No doubt it is to Heidegger, with his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), that we owe both the restoration of the question of the imagination as a philosophical question and the possibility of an approach to Kant that breaks with the somnolence and aridity of the neo-Kantians. No doubt, too, that Heidegger reintroduces in his turn and completely on his own – an impressive spectacle – the successive movements of discovery and covering back over that have marked the history of the question of the imagination. I shall speak elsewhere of Heidegger's rediscovery of the Kantian discovery of the imagination, and the – in my view – partial and biased character of this rediscovery. Let me simply note here, with respect to the ‘recoiling’ Heidegger imputes to Kant when faced with the ‘bottomless abyss’ opened by the discovery of the transcen­dental imagination, that it is Heidegger himself who in effect ‘recoils’ after writing his book on Kant. A new forgetting, covering over, and effacement of the question of the imagination intervenes, for no further traces of the question will be found in any of his subsequent writings; there is a suppression of what this question unsettles for every ontology (and for every ‘thinking of Being’).
Nearer to us, the trace of the difficulties and aporias to which the question of the imagination and the imaginary gives birth persists in Maurice Merleau­-Ponty's The Visible and the Invisible. How else can we comprehend the hesitation which sometimes, in this work, makes of the imaginary a synonym for irreal fiction, for the nonexistent without further ado, and sometimes goes almost so far as to dissolve the distinction between the imaginary and the real?¹⁴

AW-cf. David Graeber, David Wengrow, The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity, London: Allen Lane, 2021.

What the imagination is, and the saying what it is, it's not ‘coherent’ in the sense of any sort of logic or dialectic. Not only is it not ‘clear’ but the phantasia… Does not let it self so easily be seen, let alone sad (apophainesthai). It takes flight in all directions, does not contract into eidos, cannot be-held-together [être-tenue-ensemble] (concipere, erfassen, be-greifen). Still less can it be put into place and in its place beside aisthēsis (sensibility), beside noēsis (thought).¹⁵

Ontological status of the transcendental

The phantasm is not ‘nothing,’ since not only do ‘we have it,’ but it is necessarily implicated in thinking, as it is impossible to think without phantasm. (If you want to employ modern terminology, it is not "empirical given" but "transcendental condition.") It is not nothing-but one does not know what it is. It is obviously not sensible: it is "like the sensible" but without matter, and that makes all the difference in the world for Aristotelian ontology, and for all ontology.¹⁶

"The imagination, however, is other than affirma­tion or negation, for it is a complexion of noemata that is the true or the error.”

If "the soul never thinks without phantasm," it is dear that one can no longer say that imagining is in our power, nor that, in the imagination, it is a question of a movement engendered by sensation in actuality. Is thinking ‘in our power’? No, we are thinking - or we have an opinion, doxazein­always (except in sleep or, perhaps, illness): "To have an opinion is not in our power, for it is necessary to be in error or in truth" (427b21). Therefore, there is always phantasm; we are always imagining. And certainly at the same time, we can be thinking of such and such an object rather than another. We can therefore also mobilize such and such a phantasm ( or such and such a kind of phantasm) rather than another. Thus, we can always have, and we indeed always necessarily have, phantasm, indepen­dent of a "movement of sensation in actuality." The affirmation that the soul never thinks without phantasm pulverizes the conventional determi­nations of the imagination (those of 3.3) and renders insignificant the horizon in which they have been posited.¹⁷

Imagination & time, future

… it is impossible to talk of action without "deliberation" concerning the future, and of "deliberation" without imagination-that is, without the positing/ presentation of several (at least two: 434a8) sets of composite or unified "images" of what is not there.¹⁸

The imagination in general, and the first imagination in particular, can be defined as one of the potentialities (or powers) of the soul that permits the latter to know, to judge, and to think.¹⁹

Sensibility is a potentiality; its actuality is sensation, which is because it is at the same time actualization of the sensible in the object. The imagination is a potentiality; its actuality is the phantasm – which is what?²⁰

Primacy of the imagination

It is not difficult to understand why the movement that seizes hold of Aristotle in the second half of the final book of the treatise De Anima and carries him toward the discovery of another imagination situated at a much more profound stratum than the one he had already spoken about had to remain without sequel, not only in the treatise itself but also in the history of philosophy, until the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Aristotle recognized here an element that does not allow itself to be grasped either in the space defined by the sensible and the intelligible or, what is much more important, in the space defined by the true and the false, and behind them, by being and non-being. He recognized it not as a monstrosity, as a pathological phenomenon, scoria, accident, deficient form (dreams, for example, whatever might be the immense problems they should have raised in other contexts, allow themselves to be philo­sophically scotomized in an incomparably easier fashion), but as condition and essential dimension of the activity of the soul when it is, in his view, soul par excellence: psuchē dianoētikē, thinking soul. He saw that the soul's ability to think, therefore also to differentiate the sensible from the intelli­gible, rests on something that is neither truly sensible nor truly intelligible; and that thought's capacity to distinguish the true from the false – and, behind them, being from nonbeing-rests on something that does not fall under the determinations of the true and the false and that, in its mode of being as in the mode of being of its works – the phantasmata – has no place in the regions of being that in other respects appear surely established.²¹

Limits in Aristotle, Kant

There is nothing more deprived of imagination than the transcendental imagina­tion of Kant. And, of course, this position is inevitable so long as the problem of the imagination and of the imaginary is thought solely in relation to the subject, within a psycho-logical or ego-logical horizon. Indeed, insofar as one remains confined within this horizon, recognition of the radical imagination as creation could only lead to universal disloca­tion. If the transcendental imagination set itself the task of imagining anything whatsoever, the world would collapse immediately. This is why, later on, the "creative imagination" will remain, philosophically, a mere word and the role that will be recognized for it will be limited to domains that seem ontologically gratuitous (art). A full recognition of the radical imagination is possible only if it goes hand in hand with the discovery of the other dimension of the radical imaginary, the social-historical imagi­nary, instituting a society as source of ontological creation deploying itself as history…
These limitations do not prevent the Aristotelian discovery of the imagination from putting into question, and in truth from bursting apart, both the theory of the determinations of being and that of the determina­tions of knowledge-and this, for the benefit not of a transcendental instance but of a potentiality of the soul, an indeterminate and indeter­minable, and, at the same time, a determining potentiality. How is one truly to bring this discovery into relation with everything that has been said elsewhere-unless one begins all over again. Aristotle, too, in the evening of his life did not even try to do so. With his relentless and heroic honesty, and without worrying about the contradictions and antinomies he thus gives rise to in his text, he shows what he saw in its profound necessity, and in this he leaves us, if we can do so, to see further. Less profound-or less courageous-interpreters and philosophers who suc­ceeded him will try relentlessly and repeatedly to smother the scandal of the imagination.²²

At a crisis in Western societies²³

“… the history of humanity is the history of the human imaginary and its works."²⁴

History of philosophical use

Throughout… history, the notion of the imaginary has been either ignored or mistreated. As for the imagination, it was first recognised by Aristotle, who discovered it, so to speak, and perceived some essential aspects, such as the fact that the soul never thinks… without an imaginary representation. He only arrives at the question of the imagination toward the end of his treatise On the Soul, however, and then drops it… In the latter half of (the 18th century), the term is often found in the writings of English and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, and later in Germany, in connection with current interest in questions pertaining to taste and art. Kant, in the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, discovered what he called the transcendental imagination: the imagination required for knowledge to be ascertained rather than empirical. But in the second edition of that same critique, he reduced its role and importance considerably. The concept was forcefully revised by Fichte, after which the question return to oblivion, philosophically speaking, until 1928, when Heidegger, in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, rediscovered the notion of the imagination as a philosophical notion.… After that 1928 book, Heidegger never again discussed the imagination.²⁵

Castoriadis: Imagination: Social Imaginary

That which, since 1964, I have termed the social imaginary - a term which has since been used and misused in a number of different ways - and, more generally, that which I call the imaginary has nothing to do with the representations currently circulating under this heading. In particular, it has nothing to do with that which is presented as 'imaginary' by certain currents in psychoanalysis: namely, the 'specular' which is obviously only an image of and a reflected image, in other words a reflection, and in yet other words a byproduct of Platonic ontology (eidolon) even if those who speak of it are unaware of its origin. The imaginary does not come from the image in the mirror or from the gaze of the other. Instead, the 'mirror' itself and its possibility, and the other as mirror, are the works of the imaginary, which is creation ex nihilo. Those who speak of 'imaginary', understanding by this the 'specular', the reflection of the 'fictive', do no more than repeat, usually without realizing it, the affirmation which has for all time chained them to the underground of the famous cave: it is necessary that this world be an image of something. The imaginary of which I am speaking is not an image of. It is the unceasing and essentially undetermined (social historical and psychical) creation of figures/forms/images, on the basis of which alone there can ever be a question of 'something'. What we call 'reality' and 'rationality' are its works.²⁶

Caveat

Since publishing this, David Curtis has made me aware of the controversial nature of the Helen Arnold transitions. He accuses her not only of sloppy translation but also of playing a scabbing role more generally in the transmission of Castoriadis’s work. Read here before quoting or using the texts authoritatively.

“… it is open to public debate whether Helen Arnold herself displays ignorance and incompetence in her actual work as a translator. While both she and Fordham University Press Editorial Director Helen Tartar have read the first three parts of this analysis of A Society Adrift, neither has offered the least substantive challenge to the criticisms found therein. It was not I but another Castoriadis translator in another language who wrote thus about the completely unchallenged errors of the Helens exposed so far: "The list of unbelievable failures you're pointing to is impressive and very annoying. (I don't have this book.) As you suggest: a probable result will be that a reader relying on this version will blame the author for this sloppiness - and that's the worst thing a translator can perpetrate. One wishes that those who are respons[i]ble will act."

1. Cornelius Castoriadis (1975), The Imaginary Institution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, pp3-4.

2. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), Werner Hamacher (ed), Helen Arnold (tr), ’Imaginary and Imagination at the Crossroads’, Figures of the Thinkable [Figures du Sensible: les carrefours du labyrinthe, 1999]. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p72.

3. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p73.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), pp74-5.

7. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p75.

8. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p76.

9. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p80.

10. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p83.

11. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), pp86-7.

12. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p74.

13. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p77.

14. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), ’The Discovery of the Imagination’, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp213-6.

15. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p218.

16. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p219.

17. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p228.

18. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p229.

19. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p243.

20. Ibid.

21. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p244.

22. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997), p245.

23. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), p71.

24. Ibid.

25. Cornelius Castoriadis (2007), pp71-2.

26. Cornelius Castoriadis (1975), p3.